

AU/ACSC/ALEXANDER/AY12

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

**A NEGOTIATION APPROACH  
TO ENRICH POLICE AND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE:  
A Contemporary COIN Methodology for Afghanistan**

by

Brian M. Alexander, Major, USAF

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty  
In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Advisor: Dr. Stefen Eisen, Jr.

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

April 2012

### **Disclaimer**

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government.

U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts in Afghanistan are shifting into Phase IV (Stability) of the operation plan phases for military actions.<sup>1</sup> On June 22, 2011, President Barack Obama pointed to this transition and announced his way-forward in Afghanistan during a speech from the White House. He clearly articulated as U.S. goals are met, “our mission will change from combat to support.”<sup>2</sup> Moreover, he pressed that “Afghan security forces [will] move into the lead” and “by 2014, this process will be complete and the Afghan people will be responsible for their own security.”<sup>3</sup> Subsequently, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta promulgated the President’s message in his January 2012 White Paper wherein he stated the U.S. will “gradually transition security in Afghanistan,”<sup>4</sup> which he then clarified at the February 4, 2012 Munich Security Conference by adding the goal for the International Security Assistance Force [in 2013] is to “move from the lead combat role to a support, advise, and assist role.”<sup>5</sup>

This shift requires COIN forces to reflect on history and reshape techniques from previous experiences for contemporary applications. Cross-cultural considerations will be paramount and commanders must negotiate the way forward to achieve the desired political and military end state set within strategic guidance. As combat operations decline, the transitional role of allied intelligence collection efforts by military, police, and civil methods must evolve. A modern adaptation of historical successes will guide this effort. Accordingly, it is critical that a cross-cultural negotiations framework be developed to cooperatively enrich Afghan police and security intelligence collection capabilities against a principally criminal adversary.

### **Cooperate to Dominate**

In successful COIN efforts, negotiating and achieving a viable cross-culture intelligence collections program was unarguably paramount. It is further noteworthy that “modern liberal democracies have never successfully turned back an insurgency using military force alone,

though many have tried to do so unsuccessfully.”<sup>6</sup> In fact, “one indispensable component of COIN warfare, which cuts across the spectrum of operations, is the requirement for actionable intelligence.”<sup>7</sup> In conventional warfare, intelligence data is largely derived from technical means (e.g. signals, imagery, and measurement and signatures intelligence); however, in COIN warfare, intelligence data is chiefly gained through human interface.<sup>8</sup> This data is “harvested from the human intelligence, investigative, and analytic capabilities or organic military intelligence and police forces, and from local, indigenous police forces in the area of operations.”<sup>9</sup>

Influencing existing police and security intelligence programs in an under-developed and perhaps anarchic wartime environment is a formidable task even under optimal conditions. COIN forces in Afghanistan currently experience “a shortage of native linguists, unfamiliarity with the regional culture, and a lack of credible sources from which to extract information.”<sup>10</sup> Thus, what often occurs in a failed or collapsed state is a weak or non-existent indigenous police infrastructure incapable of providing timely, comprehensive or actionable human intelligence to thwart area threats. Instead, coalition counterintelligence, intelligence, and police or force protection units are often charged with operating parallel to indigenous police forces or by themselves to obtain the intelligence needed to drive operations.<sup>11</sup> In response to the President’s direction, COIN forces must continue to use “all means at their disposal to gather, analyze, and disseminate intelligence for current operations;” but it is imperative to simultaneously negotiate with local district police leadership to find the zone of possible agreement (ZOPA)<sup>12</sup> and shared interests to “reconstitute, reorganize, and train indigenous personnel to do the same.”<sup>13</sup>

### **Guided by History**

Intelligence and counterintelligence collection efforts were influential in the outcomes of COIN operations in French Indochina (1945-1954) as well as in Algeria (1954-1962). The

demise of the French in Indochina resulted from several causal factors to include a lack of credible intelligence coupled with a French inability to safeguard operational intelligence. On the other hand, after an inauspicious beginning in Algeria, the French ultimately conducted an effective community-policing style method of intelligence collections to support Colonel Roger Trinquier's elaborate gridding system. The French further gathered intelligence augmented by auxiliary police forces, known as *Parableus*; married their collections campaign with effective analysis and dissemination efforts which greatly aided their operational activities (note: success came at the grave expense of civil liberties and individual human rights); and, they organized an effective indigenous police effort that greatly enhanced their penetration of hostile areas.<sup>14</sup>

But the British performance during the Malaya Emergency (1948-1960) is frequently cited as the archetype for an effectively prosecuted counterinsurgency.<sup>15</sup> There, British Lt General Sir Harold Briggs implemented his multifaceted "Briggs Plan"; one component was the "reorganization of the intelligence structure and the emergence of police forces as the focal point of intelligence operations."<sup>16</sup> The Plan was subsequently followed through by his successor, General Sir Gerald Templer, who successfully negotiated various challenges and found robust intelligence collections to be of the greatest benefit and integral in defeating the insurgency. Templer understood the significance of shaping intelligence agencies around the static nature of the police rather than the army.<sup>17</sup> The allies then "systematically, albeit deliberately, identified, targeted, and neutralized insurgents."<sup>18</sup> With the intelligence architecture reorganized around police work, it complemented other aspects of the Briggs Plan (i.e. resettlement villages), and the counterinsurgency flourished.<sup>19</sup> In the end, the role of intelligence collections "achieved its rightful place as the principal counterrevolutionary war weapon."<sup>20</sup>

## Negotiating with Cross-Cultural Considerations

The enrichment of police and security intelligence at the tactical end of the operational level of war in Afghanistan will result from successful negotiations at the people/team leadership level. Cross-cultural working relationships are complex and “the need to work within more peer-based relationships, and the need to communicate across service, joint, interagency, and coalition environments [and host nation], all point to the value of understanding and effectively applying negotiating skills.”<sup>21</sup> In fact, U.S. Air Force senior leaders highlighted the importance of these skills within its core leadership competencies as described in Air Force Doctrine Document 1-1, *Leadership and Force Development*. While personal level leadership is most powerful when communicating face-to-face, it is people/team leadership that “involves more interpersonal and team relationships.”<sup>22</sup> This is central to successful COIN operations. Leaders who embodied the principles of people/team leadership and successfully executed its sub-competencies (e.g. inspired others, took care of people, built teams and negotiated) were able to extend significant influence over their forces to achieve mission success in battle.

In the framework of this effort, this negotiation should not be adversarial but “really a communication process between two or more parties.”<sup>23</sup> The desired engagements are cordial discussions with appropriate exchanges of information as Afghan police units and coalition forces cooperatively seek to satisfy common interests and goals – i.e. collecting actionable intelligence. The spectrum of negotiations is wide and relationship, trust, and rapport building is an extensive process, but the desired option is to “give some and gain some.”<sup>24</sup> Moreover, negotiations resolve conflict, but not all conflict is bad. The U.S. must maintain intelligence collections as a high priority and the transfer of responsibility must be deliberate and cooperative. Here, conflict is categorized as a conflict over “structure” (the process or how

things get done).<sup>25</sup> Likely, it will be coalition forces most motivated to resolve the conflict, and through relationship building, ideally Afghan police leaders will, too, gain motivation.

This negotiation rightly begins with a problem statement or task. A comprehensive evaluation of the current condition is paramount, but a suggested example might be:

Taliban and insurgent abettors' actions in the Bagram AB, Afghanistan region threaten counterinsurgent and local personnel and resources. The coalition seeks freedom of movement, safety, and security for local populations and coalition and Afghan forces as well as the establishment of the conditions necessary for long term and self-sustaining area stability. Taliban and its supporters must be deterred from further aggression or risk coalition military and indigenous police intervention. Coalition and local police forces will cooperatively work to synthesize intelligence collections to detect, deter, and neutralize aggressors and hostile actions.

Here, the relationship resides mainly with coalition law enforcement and counterintelligence collections capabilities and Afghan police units. These exchanges are to develop and maintain a productive and trusting relationship; but "this should not to be confused with friendship."<sup>26</sup>

Notably, success can be achieved when coalition members understand the context in which they entering. Author Raymond Cohen, in his book, *Negotiating Across Cultures: International Communication in an Interdependent World*, submits intercultural negotiating is prone to misunderstanding.<sup>27</sup> As a result, he draws upon the useful theory of intercultural communication proposed by Lorand Szalay. In his theory, Szalay distinguishes between "the form or code in which a message is sent, and its content or meaning."<sup>28</sup> It is important to understand the message is a matter of the receiver correctly decoding it, so that the sender's meaning matches the receiver's intention. Szalay postulates, "Since the encoder and the decoder are two separate individuals their reactions are likely to be similar only to the extent that they share experiences, that they have similar frames of reference. The more different they are, the less isomorphism there will be between encoded and decoded content."<sup>29</sup> Myriad cultural

aspects must be considered, but a few primary ones are most germane to this negotiation, i.e. cultural context, differing concepts of time, and results versus relationships.

Naturally, individuals from different cultures are more likely to have dissimilar experiences and frames of reference (context) than those of a similar culture; much like Americans and Afghans. As such, Cohen again draws on Szalay's model to identify the general differences between cultures. There is clear contrast between cultures with an individualistic ethos (low-context), such as Americans, and cultures which emphasize interdependence and a communal identity, like in Afghanistan.<sup>30</sup> In communal cultures, communication tends to be very context-sensitive (high-context); "its origins are to be sought in the historical predominance of the rural village community; the primacy of extended family, clan or caste; and rigid, stratified forms of social and religious organization."<sup>31</sup> Communication customs emphasize politeness, relationship-building, tact, and even indirectness. Whereas individualistic cultures de-emphasize the communication context and personal relationships; of which the "U.S. is a paradigm, [and] holds freedom, the development of the individual personality, self-expression, and personal enterprise and achievement as supreme values."<sup>32</sup> Communication in a low-context culture is often direct and explicit, with little patience for rhetoric, insinuation, or complex protocols.

Next, Cohen describes another important cultural contrast between polychronic and monochronic concepts of time.<sup>33</sup> The American approach to time is an example of a monochronic culture, where, for instance, "the schedule is almost sacred, so that not only is it wrong, according to the formal dictates of our culture, to be late, but it is a violation of the informal patterns to keep changing schedules or appointment or to deviate from the agenda."<sup>34</sup> Cohen continues to show the U.S. is not a traditional society, and American culture is future-oriented. Although Americans take great pride in their past, "it is a past usually re-created



noncontroversially in the image of the present.”<sup>35</sup> Instead, polychronic cultures (e.g. Afghan) tend to have a richer sense of the past and take a more leisurely view of time. Cohen writes, “the arbitrary divisions of the clock face have little saliency for cultures grounded in the cycle of the seasons, the invariant pattern of rural life, and the calendar of religious festivities.”<sup>36</sup>

Thirdly, dissimilar cultures favor different means of negotiation and persuasion to support their desires for either driving results or fostering relationships. Afghans may place an emphasis on personal relationships and group harmony and their use of persuasion would focus on cultivating a close and trusting relationship. In general, high context cultures (relationship-oriented) are usually uncomfortable with confrontation and combative styles of interaction. Diametrically different, low-context cultures (results-oriented) mostly find reasoned arguments with facts more persuasive, and often favor direct and explicit styles of communicating; this certainly fits the temperament of many U.S. servicemen. Americans may prefer direct dialogue, but Afghan preferences may largely prefer indirect communications relying on personal relationships to support mutual understandings.

It is vitally important for coalition members serving in Afghanistan to understand these distinctions and truly comprehend culture context differences exist.<sup>37</sup> Afghan police leaders could take a long term view, focusing on cultivating and improving the relationship with those they are interacting with. Deployment rotations favor low-context culture preferences where an issue at hand will have a shorter term focus. One of the most imperative considerations deals with saving or maintaining face and group harmony. To reiterate, interactions across cultures are prone to confusion. A high-context culture “communicates allusively rather than directly.”<sup>38</sup> Non-verbal cues, nuances in meaning, and the context in which the communication occurs are just as important as the message itself. Moreover, those in high-context cultures are enormously

apprehensive about how they will appear to others; “there is no more powerful sanction than disapproval.”<sup>39</sup> Furthermore, loss of face (reputation and honor) is avoided at all costs, especially if there is a chance to be humiliated in front of a group. It would be prudent to offer an Afghan counterpart face-saving alternatives to preserve prestige and status should that situation be presented. For instance, a criminal arrest, even if developed primarily from coalition counterintelligence, could be highlighted as a local police success (assuming a reasonable level of police involvement) with credit (for reputation building) provided to the district police chief.

In understanding various rudimentary Afghan behaviors, orthodox approaches in negotiating toward a cooperative outcome may not be the most prudent route. The “conventional wisdom regarding effective negotiation calls for the parties to start by making extreme opening offers, then conceding stepwise until an agreement is reached.”<sup>40</sup> This style of negotiating is referred to as “outside in,”<sup>41</sup> and allows each interlocutor to explore various possible agreements before settling and to obtain as much information as possible about the other negotiator before closing off discussion.<sup>42</sup> However, for negotiations with a high-context Afghan culture, a reverse and more creative approach may suit the objectives better. Working “from the inside out” begins with “an exchange of views about underlying needs and interests – and on the basis of such an exchange, to build an agreement that both parties find acceptable.”<sup>43</sup> It is therefore key “to work at the level of interests rather than positions – what one really needs and wants (and why), rather than what one states that one would like to have.”<sup>44</sup> This approach was successfully used by President Carter in 1978 as he settled the disposition of the Sinai Peninsula with the President of Egypt and the Prime Minister of Israel (Egypt and Israel are both high-context cultures).<sup>45</sup>

The U.S. Air Force Negotiation Center of Excellence (NCE) utilizes the Wheel of Culture (WOC) tool to aid in understanding and anticipating reasonable negotiating styles of

foreign interlocutors. A rudimentary WOC for Afghanistan (Figure 1) married with TIPO model considerations (Appendix A) leads us to the cooperative negotiation strategy (CNS) as an appropriate launching point in this endeavor. Choosing the most appropriate negotiation preference and style is paramount to success. The beginning assumption is coalition forces and Afghan police leadership “desire to achieve a mutually satisfactory outcome while simultaneously managing the relationship.”<sup>46</sup> Because of the inherent tendencies of the American culture, the challenge is to ensure it remains a CNS and not an insist strategy masked with a CNS flavor accompanied by rhetoric. Trust, acceptable levels of information sharing, the desire for enduring relationships, and shared goals will aid in keeping the negotiation on track.




Figure 1: Wheel of Culture (Afghanistan)<sup>47</sup>

## Conclusion: Presenting an Operational Approach – a Negotiation Tool

This long-term, cooperation-centric negotiation is not intended to yield a signed contract or establish a final position on a single issue. Rather, it will be a fluid dialogue to cultivate shared and prioritized interests, develop common goals, and enable the deployment and utilization of appropriate indigenous capabilities. Figure 2 models the evolving relationship amongst military, civil, and police means while combating an adversary - whether terrorist, insurgent, or criminal. For instance, military forces have a much larger role when fighting a terrorist than police and civil (e.g. village populations and city officials) functions; yet, as the adversary becomes more categorized as criminal, accountability adjusts and police forces have the preponderance of responsibility. Since U.S. strategic guidance requires the conversion from




Figure 2: Evolving Responsibility Against an Adversary

combat to support and security transition by 2014, the prominent adversary must therefore be shifting from terrorist or insurgent to criminal. This fittingly supports bettering the role of local

police forces to execute both responsive intelligence and counterintelligence collection capabilities to neutralize criminal activity.

The presented operational approach (Figure 3) is an organic design and negotiation tool that highlights specific lines of effort (LOE) to mutually solve issues and enrich police and security intelligence competencies. Each LOE is further enhanced by defeat/stability mechanisms and supported objectives to improve Afghan capabilities in order to achieve the respective desired conditions for each LOE. Moreover, this approach frames an operational level




Figure 3: Organic Design for Enriched Police Intelligence

methodology for a complex and long range CNS negotiation with local Afghan police leaders: how police intelligence can be collected, disseminated and actioned to safeguard personnel and resources. Executed with tenacity and classic operational art, the desired end state can become the status quo: a capable, collaborative, proactive local Afghan police force and intelligence capability. If negotiations unfortunately fail to achieve the desired goals and interests, each side would rely on their Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement, or BATNA (Appendix B) as their contingency option.

The British experience in Malaya is neither a single template for success nor the panacea for all counterinsurgencies. Yet, aspects of the Briggs Plan have inspired this negotiation tool and are undoubtedly relevant for today's effort in Afghanistan – namely, the valuable role of local police forces and stout intelligence collections. Briggs understood the seminal importance of coordinated “collection, analysis, and distribution of intelligence on insurgent locations, activities, and plans from whatever sources – civil, police, or military.”<sup>48</sup> Similar to Templer's auspicious implementation of the Briggs Plan, the desire here is better employment of methods already in place, rather than through major changes to those methods.<sup>49</sup> Local police forces “can gain intelligence through public support that naturally adheres to a nation's own armed forces,”<sup>50</sup> and they act as a force multiplier to operations already being conducted by coalition forces.

In Malaya, “the army learned that to be successful in counterinsurgency, it had to coordinate the activities of police and civil authorities as well as its own.”<sup>51</sup> Experienced coalition law enforcement and counterintelligence and collections agencies are primed to negotiate this approach with district level police counterparts. In their interaction, this model will guide the effort to finding a ZOPA, as well as shared interests and goals in hopes of transferring primary responsibility to local Afghan law enforcement leaders to arrest (or capture/neutralize)



criminals (or insurgents).<sup>52</sup> A transition to enhanced police involvement will also provide area villages with an indigenous face and credible Afghan partner as a solution – when the population sees insurgents as criminals, they are more likely to be valuable sources of information and turn the criminal over. The British established the Special Branch in Malaya as the focal point for collections. This concept may not be entirely fitting for Afghanistan, but their efforts teach us valuable lessons and should be studied. Templer aptly phrased the Special Branch as “the trunk of the intelligence tree.”<sup>53</sup> The Special Branch was “fully aware these sources of ‘real-time’ intelligence were probably the most important sources of intelligence on which COIN operations can be mounted.”<sup>54</sup> Finally, David Galula writes in his book, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, “identifying, arresting, interrogating the insurgent political agents, judging them, rehabilitating those who can be won over – these are police and judicial tasks.”<sup>55</sup>

In conclusion, the strategic guidance set forth by the U.S. President, promulgated by the Secretary of Defense, and viewed through the lens of history should lead to a cooperative negotiation approach to facilitate coalition and Afghan dialogue in furtherance of wartime aims. Cross-cultural considerations are paramount and pivotal in enriching indigenous police and security intelligence collection capabilities against a principally criminal adversary. The British experience in the Malaya Emergency has motivated the development of this organic operational approach that should serve as a framework and tool in achieving shared and prioritized interests and goals with indigenous police forces. These recommendations emerge from an examination of negotiating styles and techniques as well as COIN methods and practices. It further presents generalized yet essential ideas for negotiating and integrating with Afghan counterparts and should serve as a point from which to begin then adjust. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. once stated, “We may have all come on different ships, but we're in the same boat now.”<sup>56</sup>

## **KEY TERMS:**

**Terrorist:** Pursued aim of violence is ultimately to change "the system." Goal is ineluctably political (to change or fundamentally alter a political system through his/her violent act). Acts from political motivation or ideological conviction to fulfill some profound quest. Linked to some organizational entity with at least some conspiratorial structure and identifiable chain of command beyond a single individual acting on his or her own. Fundamentally an altruist and a violent intellectual prepared to use and indeed committed to using force in the attainment of his/her goals.<sup>57</sup>

**Insurgent:** Challenges a local ruling power controlling existing administration, police, and armed forces. Engages in conflict aiming to seize power or to split off from the existing country. Can initiate a revolutionary war or insurgency. Pursues policy of a party, inside a country, by every means, to include using violence.<sup>58</sup>

**Criminal:** Acts primarily for selfish, personal motivations (usually material gain). Uses violent acts, but they are not designed or intended to have consequences or create psychological repercussions beyond the incident/act itself, or the immediate victim. Not concerned with influencing or affecting public opinion. Pursues egocentric goals; serves no cause at all, just his or her personal aggrandizement and material satiation.<sup>59</sup>





## **APPENDIX A: TIPO Analysis Framework**

The negotiation process is influenced by myriad variables, mainly those related to Trust, Information, Power, and Options (TIPO).<sup>60</sup> The TIPO model, in turn, directly influences the negotiations preference and style; in this case, cooperation (supported by the Afghan WOC).

The TIPO Analysis Framework is useful in helping assess the current situation and subsequently aids in determining the most appropriate negotiation strategy.<sup>61</sup> The TIPO framework “models how trust influences your use of information and power, and how information and power influence the way you develop options to solve current problems.”<sup>62</sup> In the present phase of military operations within Afghanistan, one must seek a trusting relationship with the Afghan police forces for a cooperation strategy to succeed. Developing or maintaining a trusting relationship should not be confused with establishing a friendship; they can be very different. However, fostering a positive relationship with value takes in Afghan police and security needs and desires concerning defeating crime, but also requires providing a degree of truthful information and expecting truthful information in return.

Trust will be developed with the Afghan partner as a professional counterinsurgency, law enforcement, and intelligence (and counterintelligence) counterpart (reference the focus on people/team leadership competencies). Moreover, trust aids in meeting obligations in deed through a process that collaborative intelligence collection will result in isolating and defeating insurgent and criminal activities. Importantly, “knowing how to detect trust is a challenge, but must be mastered.”<sup>63</sup> Understanding cultural differences and behavioral nuances will further be useful tools in building interpersonal trust. The degree of trust will influence the amount and type of information that will be passed between parties; and the amount of information will be a testament to the strength of the trust; yet caution in an area of hostilities is always paramount.

A desired goal will be to receive (and provide) timely, actionable, and complete intelligence between parties. Disclosing sources, methods, and tradecraft in intelligence collection efforts are inherently taboo, but a decision must be made on what will be offered; in return, the coalition must have expectations that Afghan police leaders will also be hesitant to reveal their total information.

The desired means to achieving cooperation will avoid using power as a strategy or tool. Coalition military forces, by the nature of their combat operations, have position and coercive power over the indigenous population; but this would be counterproductive at this juncture. Therefore, establishing a productive level of trust will result in the appropriate level of information sharing thus yielding agreement on a defined problem that needs solving and the resources it will take to achieve the desired end state. Furthermore, options will likely be mutually crafted as a result of the exchange of information. The sharing of information fosters the exchange of ideas and an increase in potential methods of solving the problem. Enriching the Afghan police and security intelligence capacity should not be limited to the operational approach presented with this proposed negotiation.

## **APPENDIX B: BATNA**

The Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) is the option coalition forces will use should negotiations fail to work cooperatively in collecting and actioning police and security intelligence. A critical aspect of a BATNA is it can be executed unilaterally. It is also an option the coalition forces have the resources for and will to execute. Moreover, Afghans understand it is a credible option and perhaps even the current status quo, and vice versa.<sup>64</sup> The coalition BATNA is to remain in the forefront of COIN operations and conduct independent or marginally cooperative intelligence collections and counter-threat operations.

The Afghan police also have a BATNA in which they continue to allow the coalition military forces to address insurgent and criminal activities without improving their own capacity to provide security on their own. Yet, since the U.S. strategic guidance calls for a transition of security responsibilities by 2014, the Afghan police BATNA will be weakened as time progresses. Coalition forces will eventually call for improved performance and capabilities from Afghan security and police forces. As a result, the current environment is suitable for a degree of cooperation. Furthermore, there is a way to create a situation that is ripe for settlement: namely, through the introduction of new opportunities for joint gain. Therefore, “if each side can be persuaded there is more to gain than to lose through collaboration – that by working jointly, rewards can be harvested that stand to advance each side’s respective agenda – then a basis for agreement can be established.”<sup>65</sup>

---

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations*, 11 August 2011, V-6

<sup>2</sup> President Barack H. Obama, “The President on the Way Forward in Afghanistan” (Speech, East Room, White House, Washington D.C., 22 June 2011), covered by Katelyn Sabochik, *The White House Blog*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/06/22/president-obama-way-forward-afghanistan>.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Department of Defense, *Defense Budget Priorities and Choices* (White Paper, Washington D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, January 2012), 5.

<sup>5</sup> Josh Rogin, “Panetta Surprised his European Colleagues with Afghanistan Announcement,” *Foreign Policy Magazine*, 4 February 2012, [http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/02/04/panetta\\_surprised\\_his\\_european\\_colleagues\\_with\\_afghanistan\\_announcement](http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/02/04/panetta_surprised_his_european_colleagues_with_afghanistan_announcement) (accessed 5 February 2012).

<sup>6</sup> Colonel David J. Clark, *The Vital Role of Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Operations* (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2006), 2.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Dr. Stefan Eisen Jr., *Practical Guide to Negotiating in the Military*, *USAF Negotiation Center of Excellence* (Maxwell AFB, AL), 27. The intelligence collections business and its varying levels of tradecraft, classified information, methods, etc., inherently lends itself to low information sharing. Therefore, as Dr. Eisen further explains, a Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) must surface; ZOPA is the overlap between two ranges where agreement can be achieved. In basic form, the ZOPA here may be sharing basic police intelligence related to airbase threats (e.g. rocket attacks, perimeter breeches, IED’s, etc). In short, the CNS emphasizes “focusing on the underlying, basic, and perhaps common, interests behind each party’s initial positions,” p.14. Cooperation should further be guided by a basic game plan from which to divert.

<sup>13</sup> Clark, *The Vital Role of Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Operations*, 2.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 8-9.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 12-13. Of significant note, British had many favorable preconditions unlike what is being experienced in Afghanistan. Clark further explains, “First, the British were not neophytes in Malaya; despite brief the brief Japanese interregnum during WWII, they benefited from a century of colonial rule which afforded them an understanding of the people, culture, and peculiarities of the peninsula. Secondly, the insurgent movement was comprised almost exclusively of ethnic Chinese whose cause engendered little sympathy from the Malay people who constituted the majority of the population. Further, the insurgents enjoyed little outside assistance because they ‘had no common border with any sympathetic country.’ The counterinsurgent forces were able to isolate their adversaries from the general public, an important pre-condition for success.”

<sup>16</sup> Clark, *The Vital Role of Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Operations*, 11.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 12.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>21</sup> Eisen Jr., *Practical Guide to Negotiating in the Military*, 1.

<sup>22</sup> Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1-1, *Leadership and Force Development*, 8 November 2011, 40. Also, people/team leadership embodies two primary institutional competencies – leading people and fostering collaborative relationships.

<sup>23</sup> Eisen Jr., *Practical Guide to Negotiating in the Military*, 2.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>27</sup> Raymond Cohen, *Negotiating Across Cultures: International Communication in an Interdependent World* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2007), 25.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

---

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 28-30.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 30.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 29.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 33.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 35.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid. Cohen provides the example: "The slave cabins are tidied up at Mount Vernon and entirely absent from the spotless lanes of Williamsburg."

<sup>36</sup> Cohen, *Negotiating Across Cultures: International Communication in an Interdependent World*, 34.

<sup>37</sup> There is further a lack of uniformity in the negotiating behavior of those in a particular culture, i.e. Americans, US service members and Afghans (police officials, villagers, etc). More specifically, Robert J. Janosik suggests "the individual's personality, culture values, and the social context in which the individual operates are three of the primary components which account for human behavior." Janosik further explains, "Such a multicausal approach, in short, suggests that any attempt to understand negotiation behavior as a genre of human action which attends only to the culturally-defined values of the negotiator will, ultimately, be inadequate." Janosik continues to posit, "The constraints of the social context or situation and the role of the individual personality must also be taken into account." Robert J. Janosik, "Rethinking the Culture-Negotiation Link," in *Negotiation Theory and Practice*, ed. J. William Breslin and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, The Program on Negotiations at Harvard Law School (Cambridge, MA: Program on Negotiating Books, 1999), 241.

<sup>38</sup> Cohen, *Negotiating Across Cultures: International Communication in an Interdependent World*, 31.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Jeffrey Z. Rubin, "Some Wise and Mistaken Assumptions About Conflict and Negotiation," in *Negotiation Theory and Practice*, ed. J. William Breslin and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, The Program on Negotiations at Harvard Law School (Cambridge, MA: Program on Negotiating Books, 1999), 8.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 9.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Eisen Jr., *Practical Guide to Negotiating in the Military*, 14.

<sup>47</sup> The basic Wheel of Culture (WOC) map is taken from: Christopher W. Moore and Peter J. Woodrow, *Handbook of Global and Multicultural Negotiation* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, A Wiley Imprint, 2010), 23. Information to populate the WOC garnered from multiple sources: 1. Lakhdar Brahimi and Thomas R. Pickering, Task Force Co-Chairs, *Afghanistan: Negotiating Peace*, The Report of the Century Foundation International Task Force on Afghanistan in Its Regional and Multilateral Dimensions (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2011), <http://tcf.org/publications/2011/3/afghanistan-negotiating-peace/pdf>; 2., Shahmahmood Miakhel, "Understanding Afghanistan: The Importance of Tribal Culture and Structure and Governance," *U.S. Institute of Peace*, November 2009, <http://www.pashtoonkhwa.com/files/books/Miakhel-ImportanceOfTribalStructuresInAfghanistan.pdf>; 3. U.S. Army, "Afghanistan Smart Book, 3<sup>rd</sup> Ed," *TRADOC Culture Center*, Ft. Huachuca, AZ, January 2011, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/81291153/Afghan-Smart-Book>; 4. Author's personal experience while assigned to Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan, 2008; 5. Academic Lecture, Cross-Cultural Perspectives in Negotiations Course, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL, 2012.

<sup>48</sup> John A Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002), 71.

<sup>49</sup> Mark Moyar, *A Question of Command, Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 127.

<sup>50</sup> Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, xiv.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 105.

<sup>52</sup> David Galula writes in his book, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, "Whereas all the counterinsurgent personnel participate in intelligence acquisition, only the police should deal with the suspected agents." Galula continue to explain that "the police work, however, does not relieve the local counterinsurgent commander of his overall responsibility; the operation is conducted under his guidance and he must remain in constant liaison with the police during the 'purge.'" For clarity, Galula explains, "when to purge is his [counterinsurgent commander] decision, which should be based on two factors: 1. whether enough intelligence is available to make the purge successful; 2. whether the purge can be followed through." David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 87.

---

<sup>53</sup> Leon Comber, *Malaya's Secret Police 1945-60, The Role of the Special Branch in the Malayan Emergency* (Victoria, Australia: Monash University Press, 2008), 187.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 122.

<sup>55</sup> Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, 61. Galula continues on p.62 to say, "the policeman starts gathering intelligence right from the beginning; his role does not end when the political cells have been destroyed, because the insurgent will keep trying to build new ones." Hence, a critical line of effort to be highlighted from the proposed operational approach is the one relating to surveys and patrols with a desired condition of robust community policing, atmospheric, and situational awareness.

<sup>56</sup> University of Minnesota Morris official Web site, "Quotations," *Campus of Difference*, Regents of the University of Minnesota, 2001, <http://www.morris.umn.edu/committees/difference/quotes.old>.

<sup>57</sup> Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 41-44. All information taken from this source; compiled from several pages.

<sup>58</sup> Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, 1-2. All information taken from this source; compiled from several pages.

<sup>59</sup> Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 41-44. All information taken from this source; compiled from several pages.

<sup>60</sup> Eisen Jr., *Practical Guide to Negotiating in the Military*, 2.


<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>65</sup> Rubin, "Some Wise and Mistaken Assumptions About Conflict and Negotiation," in *Negotiation Theory and Practice*, ed. J. William Breslin and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, 10.



## Bibliography

- Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1-1. *Leadership and Force Development*, 8 November 2011.
- Brahimi, Lakhdar and Thomas R. Pickering, Task Force Co-Chairs. *Afghanistan: Negotiating Peace*. The Report of the Century Foundation International Task Force on Afghanistan in Its Regional and Multilateral Dimensions. New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2011. <http://tcf.org/publications/2011/3/afghanistan-negotiating-peace/pdf>.
- Clark, Colonel David J. *The Vital Role of Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Operations*. U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2006.
- Cohen, Raymond. *Negotiating Across Cultures: International Communication in an Interdependent World*. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2007.
- Comber, Leon. *Malaya's Secret Police 1945-60, The Role of the Special Branch in the Malayan Emergency*. Victoria, Australia: Monash University Press, 2008.
- Department of Defense. *Defense Budget Priorities and Choices*. White Paper, Washington D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, January 2012.
- Eisen, Dr. Stefan, Jr. Col (ret). *Practical Guide to Negotiating in the Military*. USAF Negotiation Center of Excellence, Maxwell AFB, AL, 2012.
- Galula, David. *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006.
- Hoffman, Bruce. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.
- Janosik, Robert J. "Rethinking the Culture-Negotiation Link," in *Negotiation Theory and Practice*, ed. J. William Breslin and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, The Program on Negotiations at Harvard Law School. Cambridge, MA: Program on Negotiating Books, 1999.
- Joint Publication (JP) 3-0. *Joint Operations*. 11 August 2011.
- Miakhel, Shahm Mahmood. "Understanding Afghanistan: The Importance of Tribal Culture and Structure and Governance." *U.S. Institute of Peace*, November 2009. <http://www.pashtoonkhwa.com/files/books/Miakhel-ImportanceOfTribalStructuresInAfghanistan.pdf>.



- Moore, Christopher W. and Peter J. Woodrow. *Handbook of Global and Multicultural Negotiation*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, A Wiley Imprint, 2010.
- Moyar, Mark. *A Question of Command, Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009.
- Nagl, John A. *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002.
- Obama, President Barack H. "The President on the Way Forward in Afghanistan." Speech, East Room, White House, Washington D.C., 22 June 2011. Reported by Katelyn Sabochik, *The White House Blog*. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/06/22/president-obama-way-forward-afghanistan>.
- Rogin, Josh. "Panetta Surprised his European Colleagues with Afghanistan Announcement." *Foreign Policy Magazine*, 4 February 2012.  
[http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/02/04/panetta\\_surprised\\_his\\_european\\_colleagues\\_with\\_afghanistan\\_announcement](http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/02/04/panetta_surprised_his_european_colleagues_with_afghanistan_announcement).
- Rubin, Jeffrey Z. "Some Wise and Mistaken Assumptions about Conflict and Negotiation," in *Negotiation Theory and Practice*, ed. J. William Breslin and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, The Program on Negotiations at Harvard Law School. Cambridge, MA: Program on Negotiating Books, 1999.
- University of Minnesota Morris official Web site. "Quotations." *Campus of Difference*, Regents of the University of Minnesota, 2001.  
<http://www.morris.umn.edu/committees/difference/quotes.old>.
- U.S. Army. "Afghanistan Smart Book, 3<sup>rd</sup> Ed." *TRADOC Culture Center*, Ft. Huachuca, AZ, January 2011. <http://www.scribd.com/doc/81291153/Afghan-Smart-Book>.